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Abstract 1. Update on Galileo
At this moment, the European GNSS
Supervisory Authority, the public
agency-half of the Public-Private
Partnership principally in charge of the
Galileo system, is built up, and the first
full-fledged operations on a global
scale are currently envisaged by 201a
or shortly thereafter. Thus, one set of
legal questions which now becomes of
interest concerns those surrounding the
possibility for third countries to host
Galileo ground stations.
The present paper seeks to analyse
these issues from the perspective of
space law, in particular as regards
issues of international responsibility
and liability under the Outer Space
Treaty and the Liability Convention,
and how they would or might impact
upon the specific context of operating
ground stations for the Galileo satellite
system.
In doing so, it will include a brief
update as to the institutional structure
being developed for Galileo, as well as
a summary comparison with existing
precedents of third states hosting
ground stations for a satellite system
principally operating outside of their
control, such as the Land Earth Station
Operator Agreements in the context of
INMARSAT/Inmarsat and the bilateral
agreements between the United States
and third countries on the hosting of
ground stations for the LANDSAT
system.
Few people in the world of space will
have failed to notice that Galileo, the
European satellite navigation-system-
to-be, has landed in rough weather. Or,
as the latest official Communication
from the European Commission on the
issue, of 16 May 2007, clearly indicates
already by its title: Galileo is at a cross-
road. 1 Not so much in terms of actual
development (although further delays
have occurred also in that area), but
primarily in terms of the institutional
structure envisaged for Galileo.
Ever since the Commission announced
its plans to develop European satellites
for positioning, navigation and timing
in conjunction with the European Space
Agency (ESA) and the member states
in 1998,2 the main idea was to create a
Public-Private Partnership (PPP) with a
private consortium as co-financier and
operator of the system on a concession
basis. That approach has been reiterated
throughout the series of official
documents which followed in later
years to further develop what was first
termed GNSS-2, then Galileo. 3
The Communication of 16 May,
however, reflects the continuing
problems with contracting a
concessionaire to build and operate the
system as such on a commercial basis,
and it is clear that the ideas on
establishing a.private Galileo Operating
Company (GOC)4 currently are no
longer presumed to apply. The Council
in a Resolution of 8 June 2007
unequivocally concludes in this regard
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"that the current concession
negotiations have failed and should be
ended".5 The same Resolution also
states that the deployment of the system
should now be feasible by 2012. 6
Let there be no mistake, however:
Galileo is a major success already prior
to its proper deployment from many
other perspectives, such as the geo-
political one. Ever since the People's
Republic of China (PRC) became the
first non-European partner to join the
project at the highest level,7 many such
states have expressed their interest in
doing so and some have already
concluded similar agreements. 8
Also the Resolution of 8 June 2007, as
well as ensuing political discussions
within Europe at the highest level,
leave little doubt that the European
stakeholders are determined to 'make
Galileo happen', and to replace the
private investments which are now no
longer expected with public
investments one way or another. 9 This
also means, likely, that the European
GNSS Supervisory Authority (EGSA)
will either 'supervise' another, public
or hybrid entity operating the system or
end up operating the system itself.
Thus, while Galileo may not happen as
originally envisaged in terms of a PPP,
it will happen somehow, and that makes
the questions posed in the Abstract
above regarding the hosting of Galileo
ground stations from the perspective of
international space law responsibility
and liability still worthy of attention.
2. Galileo and ground stations
The global scope of Galileo operations
will require a number of ground
stations for tracking and control as well
as for other purposes around the world.
Whilst to some extent the existence of
overseas dependencies of European
states could help out, in a number of
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cases other states will have to be
approached.
Of course, this applies to GPS and
GLONASS as well, but in those cases
of single-state-systems the situation is
fairly straightforward. National
authorities can negotiate the deals
required, and these can remain simple
as neither the United States nor Russia
accept legal obligations for their own
activities and operations beyond the
bare minimum resulting from general
tort law-principles, good
neighbourliness and suchlike.
Galileo is crucially different on two
counts. Firstly, it does intend to
fundamentally accept certain liabilities,
in order to entice potential customers
to pay for certain of its services.
Secondly, in this case at least two
international organisations (the EU and
ESA) and at least twentrc-nine
European states are involved. 0 On
their behalf, EGSA as the main
representative of Galileo here would be
the demanding party, being interested
in establishing ground stations for
Galileo across the world as necessary
to operate the system and provide the
services. This will unavoidably involve
some territories not under the
sovereignty of a member state of the
European Union or ESA, although
perhaps third state-accessions to EGSA
could allow for sufficient global
coverage in that sense. In view of
security concerns however, even with
such states elaborate agreements would
be required to ensure proper
implementation. As of yet it is both
possible that in some cases EGSA may
end up owning and/or operating such a
ground station, and that the host state
itselfmight be interested in doing so.
In any case, such operations will entail
questions of state responsibility and
liability under space law - which is
what this paper will then in particular
focus on.
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3. Possible precedents: INMARSAT
and LANDSAT
For international agreements between
an entity running a satellite system and
a state requested to host ground
stations interesting precedents exist.
Many such systems, whether belonging
to a state or to its entities, require
ground stations situated in territories
not subject to the sovereignty of the
operating state(s). As an example, the
case of the US LANDSAT system may
be relevant and helpful.
While such cases simply required the
states concerned to negotiate relevant
arrangements in the form of
agreements between legal equals, the
issue equally arose in the more
complicated context concerning
intergovernmental organisations. Both
INTELSAT 11 and INMARSAT 12,
prior to their being privatised in the
late 90's, had to conclude such
agreements also with states not being
members of the organisations
themselves.
Starting with the latter case and taking
INMARSAT as an example thereof,
operating a communication satellite
system in orbit to serve users all across
the globe required that organisation to
maintain a dedicated set of ground
stations spread around the world. For
that purpose, a number of Land Earth
Station Operator Agreements (LESO
Agreements) had been concluded.
Those LESO Agreements prominently
included also rights of access of the
LES Operators to the INMARSAT
segment; evidently a mutual benefit
was seen to arise from any such
Agreement. 13 It remains to be seen, of
course, to what extent that would be
true also for Galileo ground stations
outside of Europe, but at any rate a
further study of these agreements
might be enlightening.
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From this perspective it is interesting
to note that also after privatisation, that
is the take-over of actual operation of
the space system as well as marketing
and sales of its services by the new
private entity Inmarsat, for some time
the LESO Agreements took care of the
resulting complications. Under them,
Inmarsat continued to act as a
wholesaler to the LES Operators of
satellite capacity, who could in turn
provide the relevant services to users
so interested. These agreements
consequently limited Inmarsat's ability
to do business itself to a certain extent,
but provided the company in return
with a well-rooted distribution
network. Most LES Operators, it may
be noted, were signatories to the 'old'
INMARSAT Operating Agreement, in
most cases still public national telecom
operators - as mentioned, a possible
construction with respect to ground
stations in the case of Galileo would
also be for the host state itself to own
and operate those.
Whilst now the LESO Agreements
have been replaced by a Common
Framework Agreement, this basically
achieved a unified approach; it does
not do away with the need to deal with
all the problems of a satellite operator
requiring ground stations in foreign
states. Hence it might usefully serve as
a precedent once these issues start to
be dealt with in the Galileo context.
The LANDSAT example is illustrative
especially from the perspective of
substance. This US national remote
sensing satellite system, developed
from the early 70's onwards, from its
inception required ground stations
strategically situated around the world
to ensure telemetry, tracking and
control with respect to the satellite (the
technical/operational part) as well as,
in the absence of data relay satellites,
direct caption of remote sensin§ data
on the ground (the content part). 1
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In the case of Galileo ground stations,
apart from the apparent need to
continuously track and control the
satellites, the need to arrange (direct)
capture of data has more to do with the
relevance of the area where those data
are needed (obviously, one needs
positioning and navigation information
especially in the geographical area
where one is positioned or navigating)
than with a need for relay satellites
(Galileo itself crucially maintaining
inter-satellite communications for
relaying any relevant information), but
the effects would largely be the same.
It would thus be quite helpful for the
Galileo stakeholders also to investigate
the precedent of LANDSAT to analyse
the legal and institutional problems to
be solved and to indicate possible
solutions to them. Such issues are,
amongst others: the distribution of
responsibilities for maintaining and
operating the ground station to the
extent that the host state is interested
in, or insisting on, being involved
therein; concerns as to the security of
the facilities both legally and factually;
intellectual property rights and data
protection issues both in accordance
with European law-norms and in
conformity with domestic laws and
regulations; and the possibilities for the
ground station host state to itself take
part in the commercial use and/or
dissemination of Galileo services in its
own territory, read market. This last
point was crucial in the case of
LANDSAT as a remote sensing
system, but may also turn out to be of
interest as a negotiating and bargaining
tool for Galileo to induce third states to
host ground stations.
It may be added for comparison's sake,
that the international customary
obligation (reflected moreover in the
US acts applicable to LANDSAT) to
provide at least raw data to a "sensed
state" "on a non-discriminatory basis
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and on reasonable cost terms" also
results in an obligation upon a ground
station host state limiting the
commercial options. 15
And yet, with LANDSAT host states
were sufficiently interested in being
part of the system to pay annual fees in
the range of 600,000 to 1,000,000 US$
for access to such data, in addition to
'contributing' a ground station. A final
verdict on whether Galileo will be able
to incite a similar level of commercial
excitement in potential host states will
likely only be possible once the system
is close to full operational capability,
but the interests of states like the PRe
and India in investing hundreds of
millions of US$ in Galileo signify that
this is at least feasible.
At the same time, the intention is for
the Galileo operator to undertake all
the commercial activities involved in
marketing and selling Galileo services:
how would that square with any host
state itself entering the business? How
to deal with product and service
liability, intellectual rights and data
protection, and the need for dispute
resolution mechanisms, in cases where
a host state (or any domestic private
company) would be keen on
conducting commercial Galileo
business with a ground station? Solid
agreements would be requisite here.
It may be noted finally, that for a
considerable period of LANDSAT
operations a private US company
EOSAT was at the heart of the
dissemination structure, somewhat
comparable to the envisaged role of the
Galileo concessionaire; marketing and
selling data generated by the
LANDSAT systems. As we all know,
EOSAT failed after a few years of
operations: the market for full-fledged
commercial earth observations
operations turned out to have been
immature, to say the least - yet, this did
not prevent LANDSAT as such from
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continuing to be rather fruitful and
beneficial for US interests.
4. International responsibility and
liability issues
Not to look too far ahead, at this point
there would be a few aspects as regards
Galileo and its ground stations worthy
of discussing under international law.
One concerns the powers necessary or
desirable to conclude relevant treaties
with third countries envisaged to host
ground stations. Here, EGSA would
seem to be the most appropriate body
to conclude such agreements, but
currently does not seem to have any
such competence. 16
The main difference between Galileo
and existing satellite navigation
systems, as already indicated, concerns
the need in the present case for the
European stakeholders to make
participation by third states in the
Galileo system through the hosting of
ground stations attractive enough to
overcome any possibly present
hesitation or disinterest on the part of
such third states.
This is where the aspects of
responsibility and liability will play a
rather important role. Perhaps a host
state which is a formal partner of
Galileo, operating ground stations as
part of its active involvement in
Galileo operations for its own well-
defmed benefit, would be open to
accepting attendant responsibility and
liability. Without any higher-level
involvement, however, a state might
only be convinced to come to an
agreement on hosting ground stations
if it can incur no more than a minimum
of responsibility and liability.
As for the general form of international
accountability, states are responsible in
broad terms for ensuring that activities
conducted on their territory or within
362
their jurisdiction do not violate the
rights of other states. 17 Operating a
ground station for Galileo, or even
allowing it to be operated by EGSA or
another Galileo operator, does not take
away such obligations, and any
agreement might have to include
guarantees that such operations will
not be conducted in such a way that the
host state's international responsibility
might be invoked by another state.
In addition to state responsibility as it
arises under general international law,
Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty
has caused a specific version thereof to
be applicable to space activities. 18
"Space activities", or more precisely
"activities in outer space" (the term
Article VI uses), as such have not been
defined. The operation of a ground
station controlling (part of) a satellite
system or its operations however
would generally be considered to fall
within the scope of that term.
It remains to be seen to what extent
EGSA, alternatively the Commission,
could provide guarantees that ground
station operations would be conducted
in such a manner as to exclude the
possibility of a host state's
responsibility being invoked by a third
state. Regulation 1321/2004 provides
that EGSA should "manage the public
interests" and act as "regulatory
authority" for Galileo, at best
suggesting this should encompass
ensuring the legality of its own
activities or any conducted under its
sway under international law. 19
Also the specific version of
accountability triggered by the
incurrence of damage, that of liability,
addresses states. The causation of
direct physical damage caused by
space activities is ruled by Article VII
of the Outer Space Treaty as further
elaborated by .the 1972 Liability
Convention.20 This regime provides
for liability for damage caused by a
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5. Some national examples
upon the
that space
"launching
a fourfold
space object resting
"launching State(s)" of
object; the concept of
State" being defined in
fashion. 21
In particular the criterion of
"procuring" a launch is subject to
uncertainties relevant here. Arguably
the hosting of a ground station, the
activity of which causes a satellite to
become involved in a major accident
causing damage, could be seen as
making the host state a liable state
under space law for such damage.
At the level of the international space
treaties or UN resolutions, it has not
been possible so far to arrive at any
generally agreed interpretation or
definition of the term "procurement". In
the absence thereof it becomes of
interest to see how individual states in
their national efforts at relevant
legislation have tried to deal with this
issue, as this may lead to an
authoritative interpretation based on
customary law-principles. This also
applies, incidentally, to any
interpretation of the key term of Article
VI of the Outer Space Treaty, "national
activities in outer space", as relevant
for international responsibility.
Some national space laws
implementing the international
responsibility and liability provisions
at a domestic level indeed explicitly or
implicitly require a license also for
ground station operations including
arrangements on reimbursement of any
state liability incurred.
For example, in the United States a
license is required to "use or operate
any apparatus for the transmission of
energy or communications or signals
by radio" from anywhere in the United
States.22 The attendant liability has to
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be dealt with in that context as well.23
Clearly, operations of a ground station
using radio signals to control
navigation satellites would fall under
these requirements.
Similar conclusions might be drawn in
respect of some of the other states with
an operative national space law. In the
case of Sweden, member state of both
ESA and the European Union and
hence of importance for any official
'European' interpretation and
definition of "procurement", a license
is required for "all measures to
manoeuvre or in any other way affect
objects launched into outer space", if
conducted from Swedish soil and!or by
a Swedish national or national
company, and licensees "shall
reimburse the State what has been
disbursed on account of the above-
mentioned undertakings, unless special
reasons tell against this".24 Linking the
licensing obligation to one to
reimburse the government for any
international liability claims is also
common in the other national space
laws of Western-European states.
The United Kingdom, the second ESA
and EU member state so far having a
full-fledged national framework law on
space activities in outer space, whilst
limiting its licensing obligation to UK
nationals and national companies, does
also explicitly include in the scope of
its licensing regime anything causing a
space activity "to occur" or being
"responsible for its continuing".25 A
licensed activity automatically includes
the obligation to indemnify the UK
. I 26government III re evant cases.
The next EU- and ESA-member state to
enact a proper national space law,
Belgium, defines the "operator", as the
person on whom the obligation rests to
obtain an authorisation to conduct
space activities, as "the person that
carries out or undertakes to carry out
the activities referred to in this law, by
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ensuring, alone or jointly, the effective
control of the space object".27 The
consequence is inter alia the right of
the Belgian government to address a
counterclaim to the licensee for any
international liability claim that it has to
honour.28
Belgium's neighbour, the Netherlands,
similarly includes the operation of
ground stations at least to a substantial
extent in the licensing obligation under
its new 2007 law: "space activities", as
the activities triggering the application
of the law and its licensing obligation,
is defined as including "the guidance of
space objects in outer space".29 Also
the Dutch law consequently provides
for reimbursement of liability claims
addressed to the Netherlands. 30
For comparison's sake furthermore, the
Russian space law includes in its scope
"the use of navigation (... ) systems"
and "other kinds of activities performed
with the aid of space technologies" by
anyone falling under Russian
jurisdiction, calling for reimbursement
in principle of the Russian government
of liability claims paid by the latter
under international space law. 31
A final example concerns South Africa,
where "space activities" as leading to a
license requirement under the relevant
Act are defmed as "activities directly
contributing to the launching of
spacecraft and the operation of such
craft in outer space", which activities
require a license if conducted from
South Africa, which may in turn five
rise to a reimbursement obligation. 3
6. Concluding remarks
Whatever the level of national detail in
implementing the relevant international
obligations pertaining to responsibility
and (especially) liability, it is obvious
that in the arrangements allowing
Galileo ground stations to operate on
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their respective territories the intended
host states would want to shift the
burden of any such liability onto the
shoulders of Galileo, that is EGSA
and/or any (other) Galileo operator.
This is, however, not the whole story
when it comes to liability for Galileo
operations. The international space law
regime for liability mentioned above,
and its national ramifications and
implementation are, in view of the
scope of that international regime, only
relevant for physical damages caused
by a Galileo satellite to another space
object or on earth - arguably even
restricted to such damage caused by
physical impact, that is a crash.
In the case of Galileo, while the above
is by no means a negligible issue, at
least equal attention needs to be paid to
the possible damage caused by the user
of Galileo for example when that user,
wrongfully trusting the signals and
services provided to him, navigates
incorrectly - into a wayside tree, a
harbour facility, or a mountainside
adjacent to an aircraft landing strip.
This type of indirect damage results in
triggering other liability regimes
applicable - for road accidents,
maritime accidents or aviation
accidents - normally making such user
(and not Galileo itself) liable for the
damage. 33
But where it is Galileo's intention to
attract (commercial) transport users to
some of its services and make them
pay for it, there is a clear interest for
EGSA and any operator to somehow
allow derogation of such liability
claims in case it can be proven the
cause of the damage was a wrongful or
absent Galileo signal.
As of yet this is far from established
however. Regulation 132112004 itself
does not go further than accepting non-
contractual liability to the extent "in
accordance with the general principles
common to the laws of the Member
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States" and thus to "make good any
damage caused by its departments or
by its servants in the performance of
their duties". 34 It would be difficult, to
say the least, to read this as including
the operations of the system by a
distinct operator - certainly not a
"department" or "servant" in the
normal sense of the word - especially
if occurring in non-member states.
To the extent that such a system for
derogation of liability to Galileo would
arise, agreements between EGSA or the
Commission and host states would also
have to deal with this aspect of liability,
arranging for procedures and rules once
the question arises whether an activity
conducted at the relevant ground station
might have been partially or wholly
responsible for a Galileo failure causing
relevant damage.
In sum: regardless of the precise
institutional version under which
Galileo would finally see the light of
day, issues of international (space) law
responsibility and liability will have to
be properly approached and solved if
Galileo is to become the major
contribution to "the benefit and (...)
interests of all countries,,35 which it is
destined to become.
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